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the jury of any words of essential enlightlent on tle question of
what was habitual intoxication.
Appellant's fifth refused instruction was to the effect that the
defendant was not responsible for consequences which lie or any
reasonable or prudent man could not reasonably have foreseen, as
the natural consequence of selling liquors to the plaintiff's husband.
The provision of the statute is that one who shall be injured in
person or property, or means of support, in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have the
right of action.
Appellant's twelfth refused instruction was calculated to mislead
the jury, who would be likely to conclude from it that they could
not in their verdict go beyond the actual damages sustained. and
give exemplary damages.
The remarks already made in reference to appellee's third instruction are applicable to this twelfth refused instruction.
It is lastly complained that the damages are excessive. From
an examination of the evidence we see no sufficient ground for any
interference with the verdict of t:Ie jury on this score.
Finding no error in the record sufficient for the reversal of the
judgment, it must be affirmed.
BREESE,

J., dissented.
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ACCOUNT.

Statute of Linitations-Interest.-In matters of account, one party
may credit the other items that represent a legal indebtedness that should
go into the account, and thereby avoid the bar of the Statute of LimitaI Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1876. The cases will probably be reported in 3 or 4 Otto.
2 From C. E. Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 12 of his Reports.
3 From E. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 27 Ohio State Reports.
4 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in So Penna. St. Reports.
5 From Hon. J. W. Rowell, Reporter; to appear in 48 Vermont Reports.
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tions, although the othcr party has not charged the items, and insists
that they are not to be allowed him : Davis v. Smith, 4S Verm.
In mutual accounts, interest is to be cast on the annual balances : Id.
ADMIRALTY.

Co~lision-Liabilityof Owners.-Owners of ships and vessels are not
liable for any loss, damage or injury by collision, if occasioned without
their privity or knowledge, beyond the amount of their interest in such
ship or vessel and her freight pending at the time the collision occurred:
Steamboat Atls, &c , v. Phlienix _Is. Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
The reception of the amount of the loss from the insurers is no bar to
an action subsequently commenced against the wrongdoer to recover
compensation fbr the injury occasioned by the collision : Id.
The owners of a ship or vessel injured by collision may proceed to
recover compensation either against the owners or against the master
personally, or against the ship herself, at their election : Id.
The cargo which is on board the colliding vessel at the time the collision occurs is not. liable for the damage done by the ship in which it is
carried : Id.
Where both vessels are in fault, the positive rule of the Court of Admiralty requires the damage done to both ships to be added together
and the combined amount to be equally divided between the owners of
the two : Id.
AGENT. See Corporation.
[Tnlawfid Acts not presumed to be Authorized.-Defendant's constable
was employed to summon defendant's witnesses and to assist in the
defence. Plaintiffs offered to show that the constable offered inducements to one of plaintiffs' witnesses to keep away from the trial, and not
to appear as a witness for the plaintiffs; but they did not offer to show
that any other officer or agent of the town was cognisant of, authorized
or approved the act. Held, inadmissible, and that it could not be presumed that the constable was the agent of the town for any such unlawful purpose: Green and Wife v. Town of Woodbury, 48 Verm.
In order to make evidence of such acts admissible against a party, it
must appear that they were the acts of-the party, either directly or by
authorization: Id.
ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS.

See Deed.

ASSUMPSIT.
It is well settled in this state, that where there is an agreement to
give time for payment upon the debtor's giving a note with surety, if
such note is not given, the creditor may sue at once on book or in general
assumpsit. Thus, where the agreement was that defendant should pay
by giving plaintiffs a note to be approved by ithem, payable in one year,
and such note was not given on request, it was held that the agreement
called for a,note with surety, and that plaintiffs might sue at once in
general assumpsit, for the recovery of their demand : Hale & Fish v.
,Jones, 48 Verm.
A different rule is said to prevail where the debtor is only required
to give his own note: Id.
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DILLS AND NOTES.

Bona fide .Toldr. -A holder of negotiable paper, who takes it before
maturity, for a valuable consideration, in the usual course of trade,
without knowledge of facts which impeach its validity between antecedent
parties, holds it by a good title : Johnson v. Way, 27 Ohio St.
To defeat his recovery thereon, it is not sufficient to show that lie took
it under circumstances which ought to excite suspicion in the mind of
a prudent man. To have that effect, it must be shown that he took the
paper under circumstances showing bad faith or want of "honesty on his
part: Id.
Circumstances tending to show bad faith or fraud in taking such paper,
are admissible in evidence, and the establishment of such bad faith or
fraud, whether by direct or circumstantial evidence, subjects the holder
of paper so taken to defences existing between antecedent parties : Id.
Evience-Sureties.-Plaintiffheld a n6te whereon N. was principal,
and defendants and others were sureties. Plaintiff and N. procured
defendant W. to sign another note, agreeing at the time that it should
not be used except to take up the former note, nor unless all the signers
of the former note signed it. W. was induced by this agreement to
sign said last-mentioned note, which plaintiff well knew, and also knew
that the note was to be presented to defendant S., by N., the principal
thereon, with W.'s name upon it as an inducement for him to sign, bud
that S. was thereby induced to sign; and plaintiff took the note, knowing
S. had been so induced, and advanced money thereon to N. instead of
taking it in payment of the former note as agreed. Ihdl1, that defendants' relations as sureties, and said agreement, might be shown by parol,
and constituted a defence to the note: llarrington v. Hright, 48 Verm.
COLLISION.

See Adr'alty; NAegligence.

CONFLICT or LAWS.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See Judgment.

See Limitations, Statute of.

CONTRACT. See endor.
Time as of Essence.-If one agree to pay and another to take a certain sum within a certain time in settlement of a disputed claim, and
payment be not made within the time, suit may be brought upon the
original demand: Piper v. Kingsbury, 48 Verm.

CORPORATION. See Subrogation.
of
an
Officer
with his Comt.any-Notice to Agent.-The rule,
Dealings
that notice of facts to an agent is constructive notice thereof to the principal himself, has no application to a case of a sale to a corporation, by
its president, of property purchased by him in his private capacity; in
such a transaction, the officer, in making the sale and conveyance, stands
as a stranger to the company: Barae.s v. Trenton Gas-light Co.) 12 C.
E. Green.
When an officer of a corporation is dealing with them in his own
interest opposed to theirs, he must be held not to represent them in the
transaction so as to charge them with the knowledge lie may possess, but
which he has not communicated to them, and which they do not otherwise possess, of facts derogatory to the title lie conveys : X1.
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Individual LiaTbiity of Trustees or Dircctors-Equity.-TheAct of
Congress (16 U. S. S. 98) under which certain corporations are organized in the District of Columbia, contains a provision that " if the indebtedness of any company organized under this act shall at any time
exceed the amount of its capital stock, the trustees of such company
assenting thereto shall be personally and individually liable for such
held, 1. That an action at
excess to the creditors of the company."
law cannot be sustained by one creditor among many for the liability
thus created, or for any part of it, but that the remedy is in equity.
2. That this excess constitutes a fund for the benefit of all the creditors,
so far as the cndition of the company renders a resort to it necessary
for the payment of their debts: Blornor v. Henning ct at., S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1876.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Lnprisonmcnt in another tate.-Congress has power to provide that
persons convicted of crimes against the United States in one state may
be imprisoned in another. Congress can cause a prison to be erected at
any place within the jurisdiction of the United States, and direct that;
all persons sentenced to imprisonment under the laws of the United
States shall be confined there, or it may arrange with a single state for
the use of its prisons,and require the courts of the United States to
execute their sentences of imprisonment in them: Ex Parte Karstendieck, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
The Revised Statutes of the United States (sects. 5541, 5542 and
5546), provide that if the court in which the prisoner is convicted
finds that the state penitentiary is unsuitable, the attorney-general of
the United States may designate another in another state for use on
that account' Id.
It was not the intention of Congress to confine imprisonment in penitentiaries exclusively to cases in which hard labor is in express terms
made by statute a part of the punishment : Id.
When the attorney-general has designated a state penitentiary, the
court may sentence the person convicted to imprisonment at the place
designated: Jd.
See Easement.
CUSTOM.
DAMAGES.
Breach of Promise of .Marriage.-In assessing damages in an action
for the breach of a promise of marriage, it would not be a legitimate
subject for the jury to consider the consequences to plaintiff had she
married defendant and thereby formed an unhappy alliance, rendered
such by the want of that love and affection that a husband should bear
his wife: Piper v. Kinsbury, 48 Verm.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See Cororation; Deed;

lendor.

DECEDENT'S ESTATE.
Contract finr Sale of Land- Widow not entitled to .Notice.-By contract for sale of land the estate of' the decedent is converted into personalty, over which his personal representatives have absolute control:
est lickory' Mining Association v. Reed, 80 Penn. St.
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A widow and heirs are not entitled to specific notice of an application
for an order of sale for the payment of debts : Md.
Where the application for specific execution of a contract tlr sale of'
land is by the administrators, &c., of a decedent, notice to the widow
and heirs is not necessary : 1d.
When land is brought into a partnership as stock, it is. as between
the partners, their creditors and one who has knowingly dealt with them
for it, personalty belonging to the firm : Id.
DEED.

Cancellationby Partiesdoes not re-vest the .Estatc.-The cancellation
or destruction of a deed by consent of parties, will not divest the grantee
or an estate thereby granted to him and vested in him by virtue thereof,
and re-vest it in the grantor ; and this is equally true as to a deed made
under the "act to secure to creditors an equal and just division of the
estates of debtors who convey to assignees for the benefit of creditors,"
as to any other : Alpaugh v. R~oberson anl Others. 12 C. E. Green.
By a conveyance made under that act, the real and personal estate
of the assignor passes to the assignee and continues in him, notwithstanding the destruction of the deed: hi.
The execution of such a conveyance is the creation of a trust which
exists, notwithstanding the destruction of the instrument, and which the
Court of Chancery will establish and execute : 1iL
Upon a renunciation by the assignee of his trust, under such a conveyance, application should be made to the Court of Chancery to appoint
a trustee in his stead : Md.
Where, after the destruction of a conveyance made under the act "to
secure to creditors an equal and just division," &e., the grantor made
an assignment to other assignees, such assignees were enjoined: Md.
In such a case, declared, that if consent be given, the trust under the
original assignment will be established by decree of the court, and a new
trustee or trustees appointed under it; otherwise, a receiver will be
apppointed : Id.
Escrow-Delivery.-Evidencc was admissible for defendant that the
agent of the company who procured his subscription agreed to hold 'it
until he should authorize its delivery to the company, and that a person
not a director obtained the paper to look at, and without consent of the
agent or defendant delivered it to the company : Cass v. Pittsburg,
Thiyhia aut Charleston Rruilway Co., 80 Penna. St.
As a general rule, delivery of the deed as an escrow cannot be made
to the grantee : d.
When an absolute deed is delivered to the grantee his acceptance is
presumed ; subsequent acceptance relates to the first delivery : 1.
If by a condition a contractor imposes a burden upon the other party,
the latter must expressly or impliedly accept before it is binding on
both : Id.
EASEMENT.

Surface and mining Rights- Usage -Of natural right the surface
land is entitled to support from the strata below : Coleman ct al. v. Chadwiclk; Chadwick v. Coleman et al, 80 Penna. St.
When the owner of the whole fee grants the minerals, reserving the
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surface, his grantee is entitled only to so much of the minerals as he can
get without injury to the surface : Id.
A cu-toin contrary to such right would not be reasonable and therefore
would be invalid: li.
A grant of minerals and all privileges necessary for the convenient
working, &c., of coal, and the rights "'incident or usually appurtenant
to working and using coal mines," does not affect the grantor's right to
a surface support : 7d.
The loss of springs to the owner of the surface by reason (f the ordinary working of the mines, does not render the owner of the minerals
liable for damages : .d.
EQUITY.

See Corporation; Iqiunction; Judgment; Subrogation.

Discovery for Pmlumoscs of Suit at Law.-The Court of Chancery
exercises concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law in cases where,
though the rights are of a purely legal nature, other and more efficient
aid is re.quired than a court of 1tw c.n afford, to meet the difficulties of
the case and insure full redress: Iloppock's Ex'rs v. United Neew Jersey
Railroadand Canal Co., &c., 12 C. E. Green
The Court of Chancery will take jurisdiction ofa suit whose subjectmatter is properly cognisable at law, and though adequate relief may be
given there, in order to a discovery ; and in this case, under the circumstances, it was held that a suit in equity might be maintained for discovery of the party who should be sued at law, and as to the liability
of the parties against whom the bill was filed : Id.
Interference with Jdgment at law.-Equity will relieve a party
against a judgment at law when its justice can be impeached by faicts, or
on grounds, of which the party seeking its aid could not have availed
himself at law, or of which lie was prevented from availing himself by
fraud or accident, or the act of the opposite party unmixed with anyfraud or negligence on his part : Cairo & Fulton Railroad Co. v. 27tus
and Scudiler, 12 C. E. Green.
New testimony cannot be relied on as a ground for equitable interfoence with the judgment, if such testimony could, with proper care
and diligence, have been procured in time to have been available at law.
Nor will equity interfere when the facts, though discovered since the
trial, might have been established at the trial upon cross-examination : Id.
It will not suffice to show that injustice has been done by the judgment against which relief is sought, but it must appear that this resi,
was not caused by any inattention or negligence on the part of the
person aggrieved, and he must show a clear case of diligence to entitle
him to an injunction : Id.
,'oinder of (Ciusesof Action-Adtiplicit.-No gene-al rule defining
what causes of action may be properly joined in a bill and what cannot,
can be laid down. The question is always one of convenience in conducting a suit, and not of principle, and is addressed to the sound discretion of the court: Ferry v. Laible, 12 C. E. Green.
Where it appears that the causes of action or claims are so dissimilar
or distinct in their nature that they cannot be heard and determined
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together, but must be heard piecemeal, first one and then the other, a
clear case of misjoinder is presented : Id.
But where a complainant has two good causes of a tion, each furnishing the foundation of a separate suit. one the natural outgrowth of tile
other, or growing out of the same subject-matter, where all the defendants have some interest in every question raised on th3 record, and the
suit has a single object, they may be properly joined, and the objection
of multifariousness or misjoinder will not be sustained : Id.
JuIar, hed 1oman-Decree against-Tri'stecas Part.-It
is error for
which a decree in chancery will be reversed, to make such decree against
a woman whom the bill shows to be both a minor and feme cocert, with
no appearance by her or for her, without appointing a guardian ad litem:
O'Ilaraand wife v. M
lw6onnel and A'nnedy, Assignees in BankrnlptW
of Alichael O'Haea, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
Where tle object of the suit is to divest a feme corert or minor of
an interest in real estate, the title of which is in a trustee for her use,
the trust being an active one, it is error to decree against her without
making the trustee a party to the suit : Id.
The making of the conveyance as ordered by the decree does not deprive defendant of-the right of appeal : P.
Neither a subsequent petition in the nature of a bill of review, nor
anything set up in the answer to such petition on which no action was
had by the court, can prevent a party from appealing from the original
decree : Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
Orderstriking out Answer when.followced by Jdgment is ap1,ealable.The striking out of an answer because not sufficiently specific, followed
by a refusal of time to file a further answer and the entry of judgment
on the same day, is not a mere matter of discretion, but is reviewable by
a court of error, and if erroneous on the merits, tile order will be reversed.
Fuller & McKibben v. Claflin et al, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT.

See htdgnent.

FORMER ADJUDICATION.

Defence to be made at Proper Time or Barred.-In a judicial proceeding in a court of record, where a party is called upon to make good his
cause of action or establish his defence, he must do so by all the proper
means within his control, and if he fails in that respect, purposely or
negligently, he will not afterward be permitted to deny the correctness
of tie determination, nor to re-litigate the same matters between the
same parties : The Covington and CincinnatiBridge Co. v. Sargent, 27
Ohio St.
This holding is not to affect any right a party may have in matters
of set-off, counterclaim or cross action provided for by law : Id.
IUSBAND AND WIFE. See Egnity.
Ante-nuptial Contract itpon, Consideration of Marriage.-An antenuptial contract, in parol, whereby R. M. K., then a fenze sole, and being
the owner in fee of certain lands, agreed with J. I., in consideration
that he would marry her, and would enter upon and make valuable imVOL. XXV.-16
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provements upon said lands, she would convey to him by deed duly executed in fee simIple the sain , is "an agreement upon consideration of
inarriag'e" and is void under the 5th sect. of th Statute of Frauds and
Prrjiri'e, not being in writing and signed by the parties sought to be
charged: 1lJla)3 v. Henry ct al., 27 Ohio St.
Such contract is an entire one, and the additional consideration named
therein, of entering upon and making improvements upon the land, in
no manner changes the character of the agreement so as to take it out
of the statute: id.
The marriage under such contract of the parties is not such a part
performance as takes the ease out of the statute : Id.
Nor is the marriage and subsequent entry on the lands, and making
valuable improvements thereon, such part performance as takes the case
out of the statute, such acts being as well referable to his character as
husband as that of vendee : I1.
A deed defectively executed by the wife, in the attempted performance of such contract, will not be perfected in the absence of a clear
case for a specific performance of a parol contract : Id.
INJUNCTION.

J1andator-y-Itterlocutory.-An injunction to restrain a defendant
from raising the water from his will-pond above a certain height, is not
mandatory; but if it were strictly mandatory, that would not constitute
a valid objection to it : Longwood Talley Railroad Co. v. Baker, 12 C.
E. Green.
There is no general rule against granting relief by mandatory injunction, interlocutorily, where the damage has been completed befbre the
filing of the bill; and there is no difference between the case of injury
to casements and injury to other rights : Id.
Equity will not interfiere by mandatory injunction, unless extreme or
very serious damage, at least, will ensue front withholding that relief;
and each case must depend on its own circumstances: Id.
INSURANCE.

Foreign Company-State 'eyulatioi of-Statute.-A foreign insurance company can transact business in Pennsylvania only under the
system established by Act of April 11th 1868: Thorne et al v. Travellers'
Insurance Co., 80 Penn. St.
Thorne was appointed agent of a foreign insurance company; the
conditions required by the Act of 1868 not having been complied with,
he gave bond with sureties to the company, conditioned for paying over
moneys received by him, &c. ; in suit by the company against him and
his sureties for his not paying over, Held, that the plaintiffs could not
sustain the suit: Id.
The legislature may prescribe the conditions under which foreign
corporations may do business in the state, and the mode of appointing
and qualifying agents : Id.
An action on a transaction prohibited by a statute cannot be maintained, although a penalty be imposed and the transaction be not declared
void : Id.
Courts will not aid a party in an action grounded on an immoral or
illegal act: d.
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INTEREST.

Sec Account.

JUDGM ENT.

Equitable Jurisdictionover-Foreign Di'oree.-It is competent for a
court of equity, upon an allegation that a judgment is founded in fraud,
to inquire whether the cause of action spread upon the record is wholly
fictitious and groundless ; and also, whether the plaintiff fraudulently
withheld from the court pronouncing it, any flct which, if disclosed,
would have shown he bad no cause of action: Doughty v. Doughty, 12
C. E. Green.
In order to relief from a judgment on the ground of fraud, the proof
in demonstration of the fraud must be so clear and strong as to render
it certain the plaintiff knew, at the time he brought hic suit, he had no
right of action, and was without expectation of obtaining judgment unless
he was successful in depriving the defendant of an opportunity of making
defence : M.
A judgment of divorce obtained in Illinois, declared void, on the
ground that the cause of action on which it purports to be founded was
fhbricated : 1l.
A judguient by a court of one of the states, divorcing a husband and
wife domiciled in different states, is not entitled to extra-territorial recognition in case the party procuring it could have given the defendant
actual notice of the suit, but refused or neglected to do so : 1,.
The right of every person ac.cused to have an opportunity to make
defence, is secured by a rule of general law ; a judgment pronounced iu
violation of it is not entitled to general recognition : 'l.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

See

Account.

Pleading-Dernurrer.-TheStatute of Limitations cannot., by the
English practice, be set up by demurrer in actions at law, though it may
be in certain cases in suits in equity. And this rule obtains wherever the
English practice prevails : The President, &c., of the Chemung Canal
Bank v. Lowery et al., S. C. U. S.. Oct. Term 1876.
Under the revised statutes of Wisconsin, however, when on the .face
of the complaint itself it appears that the statutory time has run before
the commencement of the action, the defence may be taken by demurrer : Id.
A statute of Wisconsin providing that when the defendant is out of
the state the Statute of Limitations shall not run against the plaintiff if
the latter resides in the state, but shall if he resides out of the state, is
not repugnant to that clause of the Constitution of the United States
(article 4, sect. 2) which declares that " the citizens of each state shall
be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states :" Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

Contractor-Personnot interfering not iablc.-Persons not personally
interfering with the progress or a work or directing its progress, but
contracting with third persons to do it, are not responsible for a wrongful
act or for negligence in the performance of the contract, if the act
agreed to be done be lawful. TI'iay v. Evans 80 Penna. St.
The immediate employer of the agent or servant who causes the
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injury is alone responsible for it; to him only the rule responleatsuperior
applies: Id.
There cannot be two superiors severally re:ponslblc for the same
wrongful aet : 1d
WVray contracted with a gas company to dig trenches in streets. lay
gas-pipes, &c., to the satisithction of the company's engineer, who was to
have the right to suspend the work; Wray to bear all losses, &e., which
should happen to any person. Wray sub-let to Davis to perform all the
work for which Wray had contracted, to the satisfaction of the conpany's engineer, to be suspended as the engineer might direct; Davis
to bear all losses by reason of carrying out the work through negligence,
&e.; if he neglected to perfbrm the work to the satisftetion of the
engineer, Wray on two days' notice might declare the contract void. A
trench was made under the contracts by Davis, who employed the hands
and supervised them; defendant had no control over them. Plaintiff
fell into the trench and was injured. fiehl, that Wray was not liable
to the plaintiff for the injury: Id.
MORTGAGE.

Ylortgagee in 1)ossessionz-Action for Accout.-A mortgagee in possession of the mortgaged premises, after condition broken, with the assent
of the mortgagor, is presumed, until the contrary is shown,.to occupy in
his character of mortgagee; and as such is liable to account for rents
and profits : Awcr.son v. Lantennian, 27 Ohio St.
Where a tenant iu possession for a fixed term purchases outstanding
past due mortgages on the premises, and after the expiration of his
term continues in possession and in receipt of the rents and profits, such
contiuued occupancy, until the contrary is shown, is presumed to be
under the mortgages, and not of a tenant holding over : .ld.
An agreement between the mortgagor and the mortgageeo, when the
mortgage debt bears interest, that tile latter shall use and occupy the
,ortgaged
premises without being accountable for rents and profits,
unless supported by a consideration, other than the forbearance to foreclose the mortgage, is not such a valid contract as will bar thd right to
an account for rents and profits : 1d.
A judgment creditor of tle mortgagor, in a proper ease for equitable
relief, has the same right to such an account as the mortgagor : Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

Ordinance- Nisance- Wooden Buildhig in City limits.-The owner
of a wooden building, situated in a city which has, by ordinance, prohibited the erection or placing a wooden structure over ten feet high
within certain prescribed boundaries, which building was erected within
said limits prior to the passage of the ordinance, may lawfully move
such building from one lot to another within the prescribed boundaries:
City of Clevelaond v. Lenzc, 27 Ohio St.
The owner of such building haying, by the consent of the city. moved
it along and upon a street to a point adjoining his lot, located within the
fire boundaries, may lawfully place it upon such lot, and the city could
not lawfully interfere to prevent his doing so : Id.
Under circumstances that place the city in the wrong, an interference
on he.- part so that the owner is prevented from placing the building
on his lot, and in consequenoe, by obstructing the street, the building
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becomes a nuisance and is torn down, the city is liable to the owner for
dainages: Id.
Where the building was lawfully in the street and the owner was in
the :,ct of removing it from the street upon his own premises, ard by the
wrongful interference of the city with the rights of the owner. the
building becomes a nuisance, an order from the police court, requiring
it to be removed or torn down, will not exempt the city from liability
for damages: Id.
An agreement between the owner of such building and the city authority, made on the consideration that the city will permit him to tear
down his own building, or that the city may tear it down without incurring a responsibility in damages, is wanting in mutuality, without
consideration, and void: M.
The owner of such building having offered to make it conform in all
respects to the requirements of the fire ordinance of May 10th 1854,
had the right to do so, and was entitled to a reasonable time in which
to perform : .N
NE EXEA T.
.Practice.-Aqze excat obtained upon affidavits substantiating declarations and acts of the defendant as evidence of his intention to depart
the state, will not be discharged upon a counter affidavit by the defbndant denying the intention : iouseworth'sAdministratorv. llendrickson,
12 C. E. Green.
When, to a bill filed by an administrator against his intestate's co-partner for an account, and for a writ of no exeat, the answer, denying the
right to an account, substantially admits tile correctness of the allegations
of the bill as to defendant's statement of tire assets of the firm, and the
amount of its indebtedness, but denies that the estimates were correct,
and that defendant owes anything to the estate of the intestate-such
denial cannot avail to discharge the writ: Id
NEGLIGENCE.
Colision on River-Evidence.-In an action against the owners of a
steamer for injury to barges from collision, the plaintiff having shown
the collision and injury, may, in chief, give evidence that defendant's
pilot was incompetent: Bigley et al. v. Williams, 80 Penna. St.
Anything evidencing negligence in those navigating the steamer or
incompetency in the disehaTge of their duties which would tend, though
remotely, to produce the accident, would be relevant : Id.
The barges were floating down the river, guided by oars only; the
steamer was ascending and under the control of the pilot; the steamer was
bound to keep clear of the barges : P.
The plaintiff would have made a yrima fade case, by showing the
collision, injury, and-the accident occuring at night-the exhibition
of such lights as were necessary to warn the steamer : I .
The plaintiff was not. bound to rest his case upon the presumption of
carelessness arising from the circumstances, but might prove in chief
positive negligence: Id.
The plaintiff was bound, under the Act of Congress and common prudence, to show a light when it would avail the steamer to avoid a collision ; that this was neglected during the remainder of the night when
the steamer was not in sight, was of no importance: Id.
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Evidence that the pilot, 11after the accident, admitted the collision
was caim.l by his neglect. and within twenty-fbur hours afterwards coininitted suicide by poison." was inadmissible : J&1
Declarations of the pilot, unless made before or at the time of the collision and so connected with it as to make themi part of the rcs gesta:,
were inadmissible. The narrative of an agent of a past occurrence, is
not evidence against his principal, nor does the nearness to the accident
of the subsequent declarations qualify them as evidence, unless they are
so immediately connected as to form parts of its history : Id.
Contributorfy.-Plaintiffand defendant were farmers. Plaintiff went
to defendant's late in the evening, to buy six bushels of oats. Defendant had no oats to sell, but yielding to plaintiff's importunity, he consented to sell him the oats. to accommodate him. Defendant, always kept
his granary locked, but he obtained the key by sending sonic distance ftr
it, and went with plaintiff to the upper floor of the granary where the
oats were, and while defendant stepped back to get a measure, plaintiff
walked about the floor in the dark, and fell through an aperture therein,
and was injured. Aeld, defendant not liable for the injury: Pierce v.
Vhitcomb, 48 Verm.

Railroad-Phlaform.-Plaintiff
was rightfully at defendant's depot in
the evening, for the purpose of taking defendant's cars. There was a
platform extending from the cast side of the depot to the railroad track,
over which passengers passed to and from the cars. Stairs led through
the centre of the depot- to the street on the opposite side, which was
several eet lower than the track; and there were also stairs at either
end of the depot, leading from the platform to the street. The stairs
at the north end of the depot were open at the top, as if they might be
used. These stairs, and a platform at the bottom of them about four
feet from the ground, were constructed by an express company for its
sole use, but they were on defendant's premises, of which defendant
had control. Plaintiff, in attempting to pass down these stairs in the
dark, from the upper platform to the street, without fault on her part,
fell from the lower platform to the ground, striking beyond the limit
of defendant's premises, and was injured. Held, that defendant was
liable: Beard v. Connecticut & Passumnpsic Rivers Railroad Co., 48
Vcrm.
NUISANCE.

See .Municilpal Corlporation.
PATENTS.

Measure of Damagesfor1Inringement of.-Juries in an action at law
for the infringement of a patent, are required to find the actual damages
sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of the unlawful acts of the
defendant. Power is given to the court, in such a case, to enter judgment for any sum above the amount of the verdict, not exceeding three
times the amount of the same, together with costs, but the jury are
strictly limited in their finding to the actual damages which the plaintiff has sustained by the infringement: Birdsall et al v. Coolidge, S. C.
U. S, Oct Term 1876.
Evidence of an established royalty will undoubtedly furnish the true
measure of damages in an action at law, where the unlawful acts consist in making and selling the patented improvement or in the extensive
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and protracted use of the same. without palliation or excuse , but where
the use is a limited one and for a brief period, it is error to apply that
rule arbitrarily or without any qualification : ..
Actual daniage is the statute rule. and whenever the royalty plainly
exceeds the rule prescribed by the Patent Act, the fiuding should be
reduced to the statute rule : d.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

From a State to a Circut Court.-The Act of Congress of March 2d
1867, provided, in substance. that where a suit was pending in a state
court between a citizen of the state in which the suit was brought and
a citizen of another state, and the matter in dispute exceeded the sum
of 8500, such citizen of another state, whether plaintiff or defendant,
if le made and filed in such state court an affidavit stating " that
he has reason to and does believe that, from prejudice or local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such state court," might
have the cause removed to the Circuit Court of the United States. A
suit was brought in a court of the state of Tennessee by a citizen of
that state, against a citizen of the state of Georgia. 1frl, that under
the statute the party who was a citizen of Tennessee could not have the
cause removed to the Circuit Court, because lie was a citizen of the state
in which the suit was brought and not of "another state," but the citizen of Georgia could : Hurst v. The Western & Atlantic Railroad (b.,
S. C. U. S, Oct. Term 1876.
SET-OEF.

Assignment qf Non-negotlable Deman.-The assignment of a non-negotiable demand arising on contract, before due, defeats a set-off by tile
debtor of an independent cross demand, on which no right of action had
accrued at the time of the assignment: Fuller v. Steilitz, Assinee, 27
Ohio St.
STATUTE.
See Insurance.
A statute amending a prior statute by declaring that it shall read in
a given manner, has no retrospective effect: Kelsey v. Kendall, 48
Verm.
SUBROGATION.

Payment by Surety.-Equity will, as a matter of course, and without
any agreement to that effect, substitute, in the place of a creditor, a
person who advances money to pay the debt for which he is bound as
surety : Goe v. lNew Jersey Midland Railway Co., 12 C. E. Green.
A director of an insolvent railroad company is entitled to reimburse.
ment out of the funds in the hands of a receiver, for advances made by
him to save the property against an unquestionable lien. To the amount
of such advances, his claini is paramount to that of mortgagecs whose
encumbrances are subordinate to the lien : Id.
A person who pays a debt of a railroad company, incurred under
contracts of purchase for rolling-stock, which, if not paid, would entail
serious los and embarrassment to the company, under agreement with
the company for security for re-payment by subrogation to the rights of
the vendors under the contract, is entitled to be subrogated to the rights
of the vendors to the amount of his advances : Id.
That the whole debt has not been paid, under the contract, is no ob-
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jection to the snbrog:ation of the party making such payment. Such
subrogation is subject to the rights of the vendors under the contract,
but is superior to any claim of the receivers upon the property, in respect to payments made by them under the same contract : Id.
SURETY.

See Subrogation.

YENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Divisiblc Contrat-ailureof title as to part-Equitj-ParolLvi.
dence.-A contract was fbr the sale of a piece of lnd, "also a tract of
coal property ;" for the land the vendee '.agrees to pay $2500, $2000
to be paid on delivery of the deeds and possession of the property; * *
the coal is to be paid for at the rate of half a cent per bushel, payment to be made for the coal at the end of each year, vendee agrees to
use at least $1000 worth of coal at half a cent a bushel each year." field
on its fice to be a divisible contract : Graterv. Scott, 80 P'enna. St.
The vendor being unable on demand to deliver a deed and possession
of the property the vendee did not take possession of the coal tract nor
mine coal ; at the end of the year the vendor sued for the $1000. Held,
the suit being in affirmance of the contract, that parol evidence was
admis.ible that the land was necessary for the vendee's enjoyment of the
coal and that it was the understanding at its execution that the contract
was entire : d.
In absence of explanatory proof, on a sale in separate lots, if title to a
portion fails, equity will compel the vendee to take the lots to which title
can be made : I .
If the part of a contract of sale that has failed be so essential to the
residue that it cannot be reasonably supposed the purchase would have
been made without it, the contract is dissolved in toto : Id.
A verbal promise at the making of a written contract, if made to obtain its execution, may be given in evidence : Ifd.
An action by the vendor for the purchase-money under a contract is
in affirmance of it, and is subject to the rules applicable to a bill for specific performance : Id.
Vendor's Lien-Conditional Sale.-Where the vendor of personal
property reserves a lien upon it at the time of sale, and the property is
subsequently exchanged fbr other property by the vendor's consent, with
an agreement between him and the vendee that his original lien shall
attach to the property exchanged for, such lien can be enforced : Kelse3
v. Kendall, 48 Verm.
T'r'ndor's Lien-Proceedingby Creditoron Note and CollateralMortgage at the same time.-In niany of the states the implied lien which
equity raises in favor of the vendor of real property to secure the payment of the purchase-money does not pass by an assignment of the
debt; but where the lien is expressly reserved in the deed, an equitable
mortgage is created which passes by an assignment of the debt it secures:
Ober v. Gallagher, S. C. U. S, Oct. Term 1876.
An election to sue at law upon a note secured by mortgage, does not
make it necessary for the holder to exhaust his remedies in that forum
before he can go into equity to enforce his mortgage. lie may proceed
at law and in equity at the same time, and until actual satisfaction of
the debt has been obtained : Id.

